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"ONE MAN, ONE VOTE":

DIsREGARD OF THE PRINCIPLE

On November 8, 1966, almost one million citizens of the State
of Georgia cast their ballots in the general election for governor.
The results of that election were: Howard H. Callaway, 47.07%;
Lester G. Maddox, 46.88%; and Ellis G. Arnall, 6.05% of the
votes cast. Since no candidate received a majority of the votes,
the state assembly, according to a state constitutional provision,
fell heir to the public electorate's right to choose the next governor.
The constitutionality of that provision, allowing the legislature to
complete the election process, was challenged as permitting unequal
treatment of the voters contrary to the principle of "one man, one
vote," espoused by the United States Supreme Court. Before
discussing the case and the decision by the Supreme Court,' it is
necessary, in order to understand its impact, to investigate the
history of judicial intervention into voting cases.
Colegrove and its Progeny
The Supreme Court had consistently acted without hesitation
to assume jurisdiction over alleged apportionment abuses and grant
the necessary relief; 2 but in Colegrove v. Green,3 decided in 1946,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion, which was assented to by only
three of the seven participating justices, cast a shadow over previously clearly established precedent. In dictum, Mr. Justice Frankfurter declared that the drawing of congressional district lines was
not a proper matter for judicial determination and admonished the
courts to avoid this "political thicket." ' This caveat remained a
major obstacle to intervention by the federal courts despite the fact
that Mr. Justice Rutledge, in his concurring opinion which was
necessary for dismissal of the suit, agreed with the dissenting justices on the question of jurisdiction, thereby constituting a majority
] Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231 (1966).
Carroll v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380 (1932), held a state districting law

2

invalid and ordered an at-large election; Smiley v. Holen, 285 U.S. 355
(1932), recognized a private citizen's standing to bring an action in a
federal court to challenge illegal apportionment. See also Koenig v. Flynn,
285 U.S. 375 (1932), which rejected an appeal for a writ of mandamus
to compel an election according to certain defined district lines.
3328 U.S. 549 (1946).
The holding was primarily based on Wood
v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932).
The Court found that the Reapportionment
Act of 1929, 46 Stat. 21, as amended, 2 U.S.C. §2(a) (1964), was
controlling and did not require "compactness, contiguity and equality in
population of districts." However, even the Wood case had gone to the
merits and was therefore jurisdictionally consistent with the 1932 cases,
supra note 2. There was support for the dictum in a concurring opinion
in Wood, which however failed in its ten lines to cite any earlier authority.
4 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
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The caveat also remained insurmountable

despite a subsequent review of the merits in MacDougall v. Green,
wherein the Court held that an Illinois Election Code provision was

valid.'
The Reordering of Political Life
Fourteen years later, in Baker v. Carr," the Supreme Court
finally ended the Colegrove problem when six of the justices concluded that the question of the effect of the equal protection clause
on a state's power to geographically distribute representation was
a justiciable issue. 7 Although the holding was narrow, and merely
removed any jurisdictional barrier to the federal courts' determination of malapportionment questions, Baker signified the end of the
Supreme Court's passivity in the area."
Thereafter, two cases were heard within the next two years
which brought the Court deeply into the "political thicket." The

As was said in analyzing the significance
5 335 U.S. 281 (1948).
of Colegrove:
Perhaps the doubts were groundless, insecurely based as they were
on a reading-particularly of Colegrove-that was demonstrably erBut it is incontestible that other courts, federal and
roneous.
state, read into Colegrove a restrictive meaning; and the Supreme
Court itself, in a series of ambiguous per curiam opinions, not
only failed to dispel the doubts, but may well have given some
support to the belief that questions of apportionment and districting
were not appropriate for judicial determination because of their
involvement with political considerations.
The per curiam opinions referred
McKAY, REAPPORTIONAIENT 66 (1965).
to include: Matthews v. Handley, 361 U.S. 127 (1959); Hartsfield v. Sloan,
357 U.S. 916 (1958); Radford v. Gary, 352 U.S. 991 (1957); Kidd v.
McCanless, 352 U.S. 920 (1956); Anderson v. Jordan, 343 U.S. 912 (1952);
Cox v. Peters, 342 U.S. 936 (1952); Remmey v. Jordan, 342 U.S. 916
(1952); Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors, 339 U.S. 940 (1950); South
For a discussion of the significance of
v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950).
these cases see Lucas, Legislative Apportionment and Representative
Government: The Meaning of Baker v. Carr, 61 MICH. L. REv. 711 (1964).
It is interesting to note that state courts did not share the doubts
of the federal courts after Colegrove but continued to grant relief in
lawsuits brought by citizens against state officials challenging apportionment schemes. Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts,
71 HA-av. L. REv. 1057, 1066 (1958).
6369 U.S. 186 (1962).
7 This narrow holding must be culled from the four opinions in favor
of jurisdiction. There were, all told, six opinions, totalling approximately
50,000 words, and the case was remanded to the district court for a
hearing on the merits.
8Before the end of the term two other cases were also remanded
to the lower courts for further proceedings consistent with Baker v. Carr.
WMCA, Inc. v. Simon, 370 U.S. 190 (1962); Scholle v. Hare, 369 U.S.
429 (1962).
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first case, Gray v. Sanders," challenged the Georgia county unit
system which favored voters from rural areas in primary elections
for statewide offices.' 0 In striking down the Georgia plan, Mr.
Justice Douglas analogized discrimination against urban voters to
abridgement of the votes of Negroes or women, and concluded that:
The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth,
and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing-one person, one
vote.21
Thus, in the context of a voting case, not strictly dealing with
reapportionment, the Court first espoused the appealing rule of
"one man, one vote." 12
In Wesberry v. Sanders,1 3 the Court dealt with the problem
of dilution of votes inherent in congressional elections in grossly
unequally populated voting districts. The unusual aspect of this
case is the foundation for the decision. Not basing the holding on
the equal protection clause, Mr. Justice Black, writing for the
majority, found authority for the decision in article I, section 2
9372 U.S. 368 (1963).
college,
provided each county with a specified number of representatives and the
candidate receiving the most votes in the county received two votes for
each representative that the county had.
Prior to Gray, the system had been unsuccessfully challenged four
times in the Supreme Court: Hartsfield v. Sloan, 357 U.S. 916 (1958);
Cox v. Peters, 342 U.S. 936 (1952); South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950);
This fact was not mentioned
Cook v. Fortson, 329 U.S. 675 (1946).
in the majority opinion, but as Mr. Justice Harlan pointed out in dissent,
"none of these cases reached the stage of full plenary consideration ..
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 383 (1963).
That the Supreme Court should select Gray for its first full-opinion
decision after Baker is itself an interesting example of docket control
and orderly progression in the development of a constitutional
principle. Baker was a good 'first case' because, once the preliminary issues were disposed of to permit adjudication of the equal
10This county unit system, analogous to the federal electoral

protection issue, the merits were relatively simple. . . . For similar
reasons Gray was a good 'second case' because, if ever the equal
protection clause was to be applied in a meaningful way, the voter
discriminations there laid bare fairly cried out for correction.
MCKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT 83-84 (1965).

"Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963). (Emphasis added.) In his
concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Stewart similarly concluded, "within a
given constituency, there can be room for but a single constitutional rule
-one voter, one vote." Id. at 382.
12As Mr. Justice Douglas pointed out, the use of the term did
"not involve a question of the degree to which the Equal Protection
Clause . . . limits the authority of a State Legislature in designing the
geographic districts. . . .' Id. at 376.

"3376 U.S. 1 (1964).
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of the federal constitution and his interpretation of that section's
historical context.1 4 Because of this reliance, despite the fact that
the opinion sounded with and reinforced the "one man, one vote"
doctrine, the opinion was of less value in attempting to foretell
what would be the Court's decision in the state reapportionment
cases than if the decision had been based on the equal protection
clause.
In Reynolds v. Sims, 15 the first of six cases decided on the
same day involving state malapportionment, 6 the Court applied
the equal protection clause to legislative districting and concluded
that the representatives of both state houses must be apportioned
by population. Writing for the majority, Mr. Chief Justice Warren
began with the premise that the right to vote is among the most
basic rights of citizenship and "that the fundamental principle of
representative government ... is ... equal representation for equal
numbers of people ....
,, 17 In effect, the decision established a
presumption of unconstitutionality -for any system of apportionment
that deviates from the norm of equal representation. The concept
of equal protection requires similar treatment of those similarly
situated and unequal apportionment directly dilutes votes contrary
to this "one man, one vote" standard. Thus, in just two years,
the Supreme Court foretold and began "the reordering of fundamental concepts of social or political life in large sections of the
nation. .
14

..

"1,u

"The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen

every second year by the People of the several States, and the Electors
fif each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the
most numerous Branch of the State Legislature."
Mr. Justice Clark, concurring, believed that the equal protection clause
was the relevant provision and felt that the case should have been
remanded for further proceedings. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18

(1964).

For an account of how surprising the basis of the decision was, see
MCKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT 90-92 (1965).
15377 U.S. 533 (1964).
Once again the choice of Reynolds for the
principal opinion was the logical one. The facts indicated an example
of gross weighting of votes; the decision was an affirmance of a lower
court decision and served as an approving hand for a difficult decision;

only one Justice dissented.

"IThe
377 U.S.
v. Mann,
v. Tawes,
(1964).

McKAY,

REAPPORTIONMENT

121 (1965).

companion cases were: Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly,
713 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Davis377 U.S. 678 (1964); Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation
377 U.S. 656 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633

'17Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560-61 (1964).
18 McKay, Political Thickets and Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment and
Equal Protection, 61 MicH. L. Rnv. 645 (1963). For an interesting outline
of the parallel drawn between the Reapportionment Cases and the School
Segregation Cases see McKay, supra at 645-46 and McKAY, RBAPPoRTIoNMENT 7-8 (1965).
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After the 1964 decisions, the question became how much further into the "thicket" would the Court carry the banner. The
egalitarian interpretation of the equal protection clause finally
adopted by the Court in the solution of questions involving the
right of franchise had found considerable support among scholars
before finally having been adopted by the Court. 19 Voices, seemingly prophetic, were heard urging the application of the equal protection principle announced in
Reynolds to the various legislative units
20
of municipal government.

Containing the Principle
21
It is in this context that the rationale of Fortson v. Morris,
the decision concerning the Georgia election law, becomes difficult
to comprehend. According to the Constitution of the State of
Georgia,22 if no candidate for governor receives a majority of the
votes cast, the state assembly is to elect the governor by choosing
between the two persons receiving the highest number of votes at
the election. Prior to the application of this provision after last
November's election, a three judge district court enjoined the
state assembly from employing the procedure on the ground it
would deny the voters equal protection of the law as guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment.2 3 The United States Supreme Court,
in a five-four decision, reversed and upheld the constitutionality of
the Georgia election law provision.
The majority's opinion, written by Mr. Justice Black, framed
the issue as whether Georgia could select a governor through a
legislative election, and found that since there is no federal constitutional provision which dictates how a state must select its governor, any "method which would be valid if initially
employed is
2
equally valid where employed as an alternative."
In the majority's view, the failure to produce a winner in the
November election brought an end to the popular election. It held
that the Grair case was not applicable since that case dealt with the
right of those participating in an election to have their votes
counted equally. In Fortson, the general electorate was no longer
involved since the electoral process in which they had participated
had ended, and the alternative method provided for was triggered
19 E.g., TWENTIEMI
CENTurtY FUOND, ONE MAN - ONE VoM
(1962).
At the time of this publication only Baker had been decided and none
of the opinions delivered in that case hinted at the position eventually
adopted
by the Court.
20
See, e.g., McKAY, Rr.APPorIoNMENT 264-66 (1965);
Weinstein,

The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment Decisions on Counties and
Other Forms of Municipal Government, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 21 (1965).
21335 U.S. 231 (1966).
22

GA. CoxsTr.

art V, §1, 114 (1948).

23Fortson v. Morris, 262 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ga. 1966).
24 Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231, 234 (1966).
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by the failure of the general election to fulfill the majority vote
condition.
A dissenting opinion, written by Mr. Justice Douglas, argued
that the majority had misstated the issue of the case. The dissent
asserted that the issue was not whether a state may select a governor through a legislative election, but rather whether "[any]
legislature may make the final choice when the election has been
entrusted to the people and no candidate has received a majority
of the votes." 25 Mr. Justice Douglas stated that the general election had not ended with the failure of any of the participants to
receive a majority of the votes but instead could only end at the
point where one of the candidates emerged victorious. Hence, he
argued that if the legislature was allowed to determine the ultimate
outcome of the election, the votes would necessarily be unconstitutionally weighted, and thereby contrary to the "one man, one vote"
principle of Gray.2 6
It would appear that necessarily some unequal weighting of
votes must occur under the Georgia system since the determination
of the legislature has no relation to the actual tally of the votes.
Whether the individual legislator's vote is cast for or against the
candidate receiving the greatest amount of popular votes in his
district, the candidate receiving the lesser number of the total
popular vote could be the victor. Even at the level of the individual district the unequal treatment of voters is evident since, even
if the representative votes for the candidate receiving the most
votes in his district, he cannot give any recognition to the ballots
of those constituents who voted for another candidate.
Obviously, the Court has become strongly divided over the
applicability of the "one man, one vote" principle. For the majority, the principle does not necessitate that the candidate receiving
the greatest amount of votes win. On the other hand, the dissenters
clearly believe that the majority has unjustifiably backed down
from the "one man, one vote" principle.
Conclusion
The significance of the case is somewhat difficult to determine.
Perhaps it is an indication that a majority of the Court does not
desire, at least for the present, to extend the doctrine any further;
25

1d. at 238.
26 Mr. Justice Fortas dissented on the additional ground that the Georgia

legislature, itself malapportioned, could not elect the governor. Mr. Justice
Black dismissed this contention on the ground that the Court had previously held, in Tombs v. Fortson, 384 U.S. 210 (1966), that the legislature could continue to function until May 1, 1968. This argument Mr.
Justice Fortas considered "a weak reed for so monumental a conclusion,"
i.e., to perpetuate a wrong disallowed under the equal protection clause.
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or perhaps it just refuses to extend it to a slightly different context.
On the other hand, this decision may simply be a digression from
the Court's previously announced rationale and, therefore, be of
little aid in determining what stand the Court will take after
hearing next term's municipal government reapportionment cases.*
In any event it would appear that the rationale for the holding is
overly conceptualized, or, as the dissent termed it, "unrealistic."
As the dissent indicated, this was not a new election by an alternate
method but the same election as was initiated with the selection of
candidates at the primaries. That there is actually only one election
is further evidenced by the restriction on the Assembly's selection;
they were limited to choose between the two candidates who
received the most votes in the popular election. Thus, in reality,
the state constitution merely granted the legislature the power to
complete what was previously begun by the popular election. In
so doing, the constitution permits the Assembly to disregard the
results of the popular election, which is exactly what they did.
For all the worth of Mr. Justice Black's distinction in drawing
the issue, "if the voting right is to mean anything, it certainly
must be protected against the possibility that victory will go to the
loser." 27
The majority asserted that Gray dealt with the right of the
voters "to vote and have their votes counted without impairment
or dilution." That the results here "impaired and diluted" ballots
seems apparent. The fact that a state constitutional provision,
expressing the majority's will, permitted it, is of no consequence.
As was stated in Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 2s "an
individual's constitutionally protected right to cast an equally
weighted vote cannot be denied even by a majority of the State's
electorate ....,,29 This system is as effective to nullify the weight
of votes as is gross malapportionment. Certainly the decision in
Gray was not meant merely to protect the physical act of casting
a ballot, but was intended to safeguard its effectiveness. Intellectually, rather than attempt to turn around, it might have been
less painful for the Court to go a little deeper into the briars of
the "political thicket."

* Since the writing of this article, the Supreme Court has decided that
the "one man, one vote" principle does not apply to the election of county
administrative bodies. Sailors v. Kent County Bd. of Educ., 35 U.S.L. WFErK

4462 (U.S. II May 23, 1967).

Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231, 243 (1966).
(Fortas, J., dissenting).
713 (1964)
(companion case to Reynolds).
28Id. at 736. In that case the Court struck down a Colorado apportionment plan which a majority of voters in every county had approved,
because it provided for weighted districts in one state house.
27

28377 U.S.

